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Since early in the twentieth century, the international community has
discussed the possibility of creating a court to handle the most serious
international crimes.! That possibility is about to become reality.2 At a June
1998 convention in Rome, an overwhelming majority of nations approved the
creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC).3 Passed by a vote of 120
to 7,4 this treaty contains guidelines for the formation of the ICC, which will
be dedicated to the issues of genocide, crimes against humanity, serious war
crimes, and international aggression.5
One would think this to be a significant step in bringing to justice those
who commit these acts. However, loopholes in the current agreement, many
of which were created to appease the United States, which voted against the
ICC, may lead to an ineffective court.6 While the treaty it suffers from some
inconsistencies, many of which can be attributed to the attempts to appease
the United States, whose withdrawal results from fears that the ICC will hear
cases in which its soldiers are prosecuted.'
The problems with the ICC statute lie in the judicial process.8 For
example, under the current guidelines of the ICC, each country involved in
a potential case would have the opportunity to take jurisdiction of the case
1. See Secretariat of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, The CICC
International Criminal Court Home Page (visited Mar. 13, 2000) <http://www.igc.org/icc/>
[hereinafter CICCHome Page]. Discussions for creating an international criminal court have
been taking place on and off since the end of World War I. Id. The most recent rounds of
discussion began at the end of the 1980's. Id.
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Conference on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. Thomas W. Lippman, War Crimes Court Approval Gives U.S. a Dilemma, WASH. POST,
July 23, 1998, at A22.
4. Douglass W. Cassell, Jr., U.S. Fears Undercut Tribunal, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug 18,
1998, at 5. There were twenty-one abstentions. Id.
5. CICC Home Page, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Lippman, supra note 3, at A22.
8. Id.
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before the ICC prosecutor could proceed, so long as that country was capable
of making a fair and honest effort to seek justice.9 Furthermore, although the
United Nations Security Council does not have to approve ICC investigations
and cannot veto them, it can postpone the investigations indefinitely on a
year by year basis.1°
Additionally, signatory nations to the treaty may opt out of war crimes
for seven years, meaning they would not fall under the ICC's jurisdiction."
These loopholes will lead to extensive delays in the judicial process or, even
worse, prevent justice from being served against those who commit the acts
the ICC is attempting to deter.
To see the potential problems one need only look at the recent ad hoc
war tribunal in the former Yugoslavia and apply the ICC's standards to the
case. For example, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,12 the first international war
crimes trial since World War 11,13 was tried by a United Nations tribunal to
adjudicate serious crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia.14 The
tribunal charged Tadic with thirty-one counts of various crimes against
humanity involving the torture and murder of prisoners at Serbian prison
camps during 1992.15 The tribunal convicted Tadic of eleven counts and
acquitted him of the remaining twenty.16 His appeal regarding the
jurisdiction and authority of the international tribunal was denied by a vote
of four to one.17
Had Tadic been tried by the rules governing the ICC, the issue may
never have appeared before the international community.18 However,
9. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12.
10. Id. art. 15.
11. See id. pt. 2, Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law.
12. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996).
13. Id.
14. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, (Oct. 1997), reprinted in 91 A.J.I.L. 718 at
720-721. The court hearing this case consisted ofjudges from Australia, Malaysia, and the
United States. Id.
15. Id. at 718. 125 witnesses testified at the trial, which lasted seven months. Id. at 718.
16. Id. at 718. The convictions included ten specific counts related to "beatings," and a
single general persecution count. In the majority of circumstances, the indictment assigned
three counts to each charged act, which consisted of: 1) "a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions as recognized by Article 2 of the Statute of the Tribunal," 2) "an offense against
the laws of war as recognized by Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal," and 3) "a crime
against humanity as recognized by Article 5 of the Statute of the Tribunal." Tadic was
unanimously acquitted of all nine of the specific murder charges because the evidence was
deemed to be insufficient. Id at 718.
17. Dusko Tadic, 35 I.L.M. at 75.
18. Cassell, supra note 4, at 5.
[Vol. 20
THE ICC: FAR FROM PERFECT
assuming that the case would have reached the jurisdiction of the ICC, the
UN Security Council could still have postponed it.1 9 Because there is no
limit to this process, 20 the UN Security Council has the power to postpone
indefinitely a case under this procedure.21
While significant progress has been made toward creating the ICC, and
the idealistic purposes behind it are laudable, further improvements are
required to increase its effectiveness.22 The remaining loopholes represent
problems that could seriously impede years of hard work. Unfortunately, it
may take a few cases slipping through these loopholes to convince the parties
to close them. However, it need not come to that. Adjustments to the
procedures involved in trying these criminals would help ensure an effective
ICC, bring to justice those who offend notions of humanity, and deter others
from doing the same.
Part II of this Note discusses the history of the ICC and explores the
Rome Convention's debates over the ICC. Part III examines war crimes
under the ICC and takes the recent ad hoc tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia23 as an example of the current ICC statute's weaknesses. Part IV
makes some suggestions for improvement for the ICC statute. Finally, this
Note concludes by offering a summary of the current condition of the ICC,
highlighting its weaknesses and offering solutions to them.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ICC
To understand what the United Nations is trying to accomplish in
creating the ICC, it is necessary to review the ICC's origins.24 Following
World War I, there was a modest attempt by the international community to
establish an international tribunal to handle matters similar to those being




22. Fransisco Soberon, representative ofAPRODEH at the Rome Conference, Perspec-tives
on the Rome Treaty from Around the World, <http://www.perspectives.txt at
gopher.igc.apc.org> (visited on 10/11/98). (This source on file with the New York Law
School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
23. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, (Oct. 1997), reprinted in 91 A.J.I.L. 718.
24. See Secretariat of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, The CICC
International Criminal Court Home Page, Timeline (visited Mar. 13, 2000)
<http://www.igc.org/icc/html/timeline.htm> [hereinafter CICC Timeline].
25. Id.
20001
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committed during the war by the German leader, Kaiser Wilhem,26 there was
an outcry for justice. 27 However, because no legal precedent existed, how
was justice to be served? The depression soon hit the United States, and
shortly thereafter the world was preparing for another world war.
28
A. The Nuremburg Trial and the Genocide Convention
The next effort to create the ICC came after World War 11.29 That effort
began with the Nuremburg Trial3° and culminated in 1948 when the UN
adopted the Genocide Convention. 3 The Genocide Convention outlawed
any acts that were intended to extinguish a racial, national, ethnic or religious
group.32 Also, the Convention declared the need for establishing a permanent
court to handle these matters.3 3 However, numerous countries would not
agree to an international legal jurisdiction.34 Therefore, the establishment of
the International Criminal Court was delayed.35
The ideas set forth during the Nuremburg Trial began to evolve during
the 1950S.36 During that time, the International Law Commission was
authorized to codify the principles incorporated within the Nuremburg
Charter and began drafting a statute that would ultimately create an
international criminal court. 37 That effort, however, never got off the ground,
as the world began to settle into the cold war while the United Nations turned
its attention to other matters.38 It would be decades before the idea would
resurface.
39
26. Establishing an International Criminal Court Major Unresolved Issues in the Draft
Statute, May 1998 Revised, Vol. 1 Num. 1 at 1.
27. See CICC Timeline,, supra note 24.
28. Id. However, the horrors of war would soon remind the world that something was
necessary to deter these atrocities and bring the perpetrators to justice. Id.
29. Id.
30. SEE CICC T1MELINE, SUPRA NOTE 24.
31. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12, 1951,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See CICC Timeline, Supra note 24..
35. See CICC Timeline,, supra note 24.
36. Id.
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B. Resurgence of the International Criminal Court
The idea of establishing an international criminal court resurfaced in the
late 1980's.4" In 1989 Trinidad and Tobago reintroduced the idea to the UN
General Assembly for the purposes of combating drug trafficking.41 The
request was given great consideration, perhaps because of the timing.42 The
cold war had come to an end and war was beginning in the former
Yugoslavia. 43 The General Assembly once again asked the International Law
Commission to create a draft statute for the purpose of creating a permanent
ICC.
44
During the 1990s the United Nations created an ad hoc War Crimes
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.45 In addition, six sessions of the
Preparatory Committee (created by the General Assembly) have been held
to draft and discuss various issues involved in creating the ICC. 46 Thus, we
have seen some major developments in the recent past toward establishing
the ICC.
C. The Rome Convention
In June of 1998, during the Rome Convention, an overwhelming
majority of nations voted to approve the treaty that would create the ICC.
4 7
The final vote was 120 to 7, with only the United States, China, Iraq, Israel,
Libya, Qatar, and Yemen opposing the treaty.48
The treaty must be ratified by sixty nations by the end of the year 2000
before it enters into force.49 Initially, several human rights groups felt this






45. See United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal ofthe Former Yugoslavia, (visited
Mar. 13, 2000) <http:/ www.un.org/icty/>.
46. See CICC Timeline,, supra note 24.
47. Lippman, supra note 3, at A22.
48. Id.
49. Bonino Wants Speedy ICC Ratification, INT'L PRESS SERVICE Oct. 1, 1998, at 1.
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most other treaties.5° However, it appears likely that the treaty will be
ratified by the necessary number of states." As of March 8, 2000 ninety-five
nations had signed the treaty and seven had ratified it." Ratification is
normally accomplished when a treaty meets the approval of the national
legislature.53
1. United States Opposition to the ICC
Although seventy-seven nations have signed the Rome Statute, the
United States is not among them.5 4 The United States is primarily concerned
with the power of the ICC's independent counsel to conduct investigations
and the jurisdiction the ICC would have over nations that did not sign the
treaty.55 The United States fears prosecution of its soldiers overseas, feeling
this would be an opportunity for anti-American sentiments to be acted
50. Id at 1. Emma Bonino, Chief of the European Commission's Humanitarian Office,
pointed out that after opening for signature in December of 1997, the Land Mines Convention
was ratified by forty-five nations by the end of September 1998. She emphasized that this
example proves that the sixty votes needed to ratify the ICC Statute by December 31, 2000
is easily within reach.
51. See Secretariat of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute
Signature and Ratification Chart, (visited Mar. 13, 2000) <http://www.igc.org/icc/
rome/html/ratify.html>. Rome Statute Ratifications: Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, San
Marino, Italy, Fiji, Ghana, and Norway. Rome Statute Signatories: Albania, Andorra, Angola,
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin,
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France,
Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Namibia,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Poland, Republic
of Korea, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, St. Lucia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Trinidad
and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
52. Id. The ratifying countries are Senegal, Trinidad and Tobago, San Marino, Italy, Fiji,
Ghana, and Norway. Id.
53. United Nations Department of Public Information, Setting the Record Straight: The
International Criminal Court. <Gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org//00/orgs/icc/undocs/faq-
dpi.txt> (This source is on file with the New York Law School Journal of International and
Comparative Law).
54. Lippman, supra note 3, at A22.
55. Id.
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upon. 6 However, others have argued that the safeguards provided for within
the ICC would prevent any such persecution." Some have even gone so far
as to blame President Clinton for American refusal to accept the treaty.58
They claim Clinton is afraid to stand up to the Secretary of Defense, who
opposes the treaty.59 Still others have warned that the United States may
stand to become a "safe haven" for criminals who are being sought after by
the ICC since they would not be subject to its authority.6"
2. Support for the ICC
Despite the current stance of the United States, an overwhelming
majority of the world,61 including non-governmental organizations (NGO)
within the United States itself, are in support of the ICC.62 The Lawyers
Committee of Human Rights63 , Amnesty International64 , the NGO
56. Id. According to David Schaffer, United States Ambassador-at-Large, the power of a
permanent independent prosecutor to initiate investigations prompted concerns that U.S.
soldiers could be subjected to politically motivated prosecutions. In addition, the U.S.
objected to the ICC's jurisdiction over citizens of non-signatory countries. This concern was
highlighted by the belief that the U.S. Senate would not ratify the treaty any time soon,
making the U.S. a non-participatory country and yet still subject to the ICC's jurisdiction. Id.
57. Bartram S. Brown, International Prosecutor, Independent Counsel, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Sept. 10, 1998, at 1.
58. Cassell, supra note 4, at 5.
59. Id.
60. See Alvin P. Adams, USA Statement on the United States'Position, UNITED NATIONS
Ass'N, July 23, 1998, at 5 (taken from Perspecitves on the Rome Treaty from Around the
World, <http://www.perspectives.txt at gopher.igc.apc.org>), wherein the President ofUNA-
USA, states: "by staying outside the treaty, the United States risks making itself into the
industrialized world's haven for accused war criminals, since America's European allies,
Canada, and Japan are all united in strong support of the court." Id.
61. Lippman, supra note 3, at A22.
62. CICC Home Page, supra note 1.
63. See CICC Home Page, supra note 1. The Lawyers Committee of Human Rights feels
the ICC is needed to achieve the following goals: "end impunity, afford redress, counter the
failure of national systems, remedy the limitations of ad hoc tribunals, provide an
enforcement mechanism, and serve as a model." Id.
64. Amnesty International, The Court: Why Is It Necessary? (visited Oct. 10, 1998)
<http://icc.anmesty.it/en/index.html> (This source is on file with the New York Law School
Journal of International and Comparative Law). Amnesty International feels the ICC is
necessary for the following reasons:
"1) Bringing perpetrators to justice sends a clear message that violations of human
rights will not be tolerated and that those who commit such acts will be held fully
accountable. 2) National governments are often unwilling or unable to investigate
gross human rights violations and bring those responsible to justice. 3) Respect for
2000]
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Coalition65, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan66 have all provided
persuasive reasons for the creation of the ICC. Indeed, Annan has called the
ICC treaty "a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights
and the rule of law."67
Also, for the first time within any treaty of this type, victims under the
ICC will be allowed to claim reparations." Those convicted may be liable
for restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.6 9 This power allows the
court to determine the scope of the harm. 70 This element may serve as a
deterrent to some who may consider violating the principles of the ICC.
the rule of law, national and international, cannot be maintained unless those who
violate the most basic norms of civilized behavior are brought to justice. 4) An
international criminal court will provide a mechanism to enforce international
criminal law. 5) People who commit grave human rights violations must be brought
to justice if they are not to benefit from their crimes and if the cycle of impunity and
further violations is to be broken. 6) The victims, their relatives and society at large
need and deserve to know the truth. Only the attribution of personal responsibility
for human rights crimes can prevent whole groups being blamed and sectional
hatreds intensifying. 7) Without justice and truth there can be no lasting and
effective reconciliation." Id.
65. CICC Home Page, supra note 1. Over three hundred participating organizations are
listed on this site as of August 1998. This coalition performs the following activities in an
effort to advocate the creation of the ICC:
"1) Convene the Coalition and its working groups, such as the ad hoc Tribunal/ICC
funding working group, information/media working group, and a working group on
U.S. strategies. 2) Maintain a World Wide Web page, international computer
conferences and listserv email lists to facilitate the exchange of NGO and expert
documentation and information concerning the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC
negotiations and to foster discussion and debate about substantive issues arising
from the negotiations for establishing a permanent International Criminal Court.
3) Facilitate meetings between the Coalition and representatives of governments,
UN officials and others involved in the ICC negotiations. 4) Promote education and
awareness of the ICC proposals and negotiations at relevant public and professional
conferences-including UN conferences, committee, commission and preparatory
meetings. 5) Produce newsletters, media advisories, reviews and papers on the
developments and negotiations." Id.
66. Kofi Annan, Opening Remarks: Advocating for an International Criminal Court, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 363 (Dec. 1997).
67. United Nations Department of Public Information, supra note 53.
68. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 75.
69. Id.
70. Fiona McKay, Legal Officer, Redress, Perspectives on the Rome Treaty from Around
the World, <perspectives.txt at gopher.igc.apc.org> (This source is on file with theNew York
Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
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3. Loopholes in the ICC
Loopholes in the construction of the ICC present avery real obstacle to
its effectiveness. These loopholes include the opportunity of an affected
nation to take a case instead of the ICC prosecutor,7 the unlimited veto
power of the UN Security Council,72 and the "opt out" provision for signatory
nations with respect to war crimes.73
First, under the ICC as it currently stands, a country that is involved in
an ICC investigation may have the option of taking the case before it reaches
the ICC. 74 In effect, this provision takes away any jurisdiction the ICC may
have, provided that a court within the country accepts the case and is capable
of conducting an honest investigation.75 What then, is the purpose of having
an International Criminal Court when it may not even be able to try the
accused war criminals whose sentencing was a major purpose of creating the
court?
Some view the treaty as a "substantial retreat" from the jurisdiction
originally foreseen.76 The results of such a retreat will seriously impede the
court's effectiveness by shrinking its jurisdiction.77
A second glaring loophole in the treaty involves the UN Security
Council. Under the treaty, investigations by the ICC prosecutor may be
conducted without Security Council approval, and in fact, the Security
Council cannot even veto such investigations. 78 However, provided each of
the five members agree, the Security Council may delay the investigation for
a period of twelve months.79 In addition, the Security Council may renew
this postponement each year for an indefinite period of time.8° In other
words, the Security Council can effectively block any investigations it does
not want conducted for an unlimited amount of time; an extremely powerful
position to hold.8'
71. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
72. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 16.
73. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pt. 2.
74. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
75. Id.
76. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Perspectives on the Rome Treaty from Around
the World, <perspectives.txt atgopher.igc.apc.org> (This source is on file with the New York
Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
77. Id.
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This provision has caused concern around the world. Some opponents,
such as Fransisco Soberon of the Asociacion Pro Derechos Humanuos
(APRODEH) have gone so far as to insist that the Security Council not
intervene in the ICC at all.82 Recently, Indian Professor Usha Ramanathan
presented an interesting theory on why this provision was included in the
treaty.83 Ramanathan suggests that the world has not yet grown accustomed
to the post-cold-war world we now live in and thus reverts to the traditional
way of doing things84 by deferring to Security Council decisions.85 Whatever
the reason, the negative potential of such a provision is too great to allow its
endurance.
A final loophole in the treaty allows signatory nations to opt out for war
crimes under the ICC's jurisdiction for up to seven years.86 However,
inexplicably, non-signatory nations do not have that right.87 This logic has
been questioned.88 Here again, the treaty has created a loophole where it was
trying to compromise.89
III. WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ICC
To help illustrate the effect these loopholes may have, one need only
apply them to recent incidents in the former Yugoslavia.9 ° Reviews on the
success of this ad hoc tribunal have been mixed. Kofi Annan has pointed to
it as an example of success and a stepping stone that has established a
valuable precedent for the ICC.91 Others, however, have pointed to it as a
82. Fransisco Soberon, APRODEH, Perspectives on the Rome Treaty from Around the
World, <gopher.igc.apc.org> (perspectives.txt) (This source is on file with the New YorkLaw
School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
83. Usha Ramanathan, Perspectives on the Rome Treaty from Around the World, <gopher.
igc.apc.org> (perspectives.txt). (This source is on file with the New York Law School
Journal of International and Comparative Law).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Rome Statute, supra note 73, pt. 2.
87. Id.
88. Cassell, supra note 4.
89. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 17.
90. While tribunals dealt with cases in the Former Yugoslavia like the Tadic case (See
Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996)), trouble arose again in the Kosovo region in 1998.
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic prompted NATO attacks with accusations of "ethnic
cleansing" of ethnic Albanians. On March 23, 1999 NATO ordered airstrikes against Serbia.
The air campaign lasted seventy-seven days. NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in
Kosovo <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm> (visited March 20, 2000) at 4.
91. Annan, supra note 66, at 6.
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model of ineffectiveness.92 Proponents of the ICC stress that the lack of
speed with which the war crimes trials got under way indicates the need for
the ICC.93 Additionally, ICC proponents note that ad hoc tribunals do not
have the power to award reparations to victims of international crimes, unlike
the current ICC treaty.94
The case of Dusko Tadic95 is an example of potential problems
associated with the ICC. Tadic was indicted for committing violations of
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and appealed the
jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunal created for the former Yugoslavia.96
Though he was convicted on eleven counts and lost his appeal by a vote of
four to one, 97 the case brings up an interesting scenario for demonstrating the
potential effects of the aforementioned loopholes in the current treaty. If, at
the time of the tribunal, the Former Yugoslavia had a national government
with a capable judicial system it would have had an option to hear the case
instead of the ICC.98 This scenario may pose some problems. One could
foresee the possibility of a somewhat biased trial or perhaps a lenient
sentence handed down if a government, particularly one that was going
through some turmoil, were trying one of its own officials. Potential bias
aside, some countries' courts may not be capable of proceeding as quickly
with the case as the ICC would. For example, their case load for courts may
be backed up or their court system may not be organized enough to handle
a case of this magnitude.
The power of the UN Security Council to delay investigations
indefinitely poses another problem.99 Suppose the five member Security
Council had a particular interest in a case like Tadic, or perhaps they had no
significant interest but simply decided to delay the investigation for twelve
months. And again, a year later, they chose to do the same thing.'00 And so
on, and so on. Someone like Tadic may never face trial or his trial may be
significantly delayed. Regardless of the unlikelihood of this happening, it
92. War Crimes: The Need For a Strong International Court, STATESMAN (INDIA), August
18, 1998, at 2 [hereinafter War Crimes].
93. Id.
94. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 75.
95. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 75.
98. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
99. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 16.
100. Id.
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puts the power ofjustice in the hands of five nations."10 Surely, the purpose
of the ICC cannot be to place the fate of the world's worst criminals in the
hands of so few.
Finally, suppose the former Yugoslavia was a signatory nation to the
current ICC treaty. Such status would permit them to opt out of a war crime
case for seven years.10 2 The Tadic case involved war crimes, and therefore
Tadic could have escaped trial for seven years if the former Yugoslavia chose
to opt out. 10 3 Once again, the criminal wins because of a loophole, and
justice and the international community suffer.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
So what can be done? The best method to answer that question is to
examine the loopholes one by one. First, the provision allowing a nation
involved to take the case ahead of the ICC should be eliminated.10 4 As noted
by the Lawyers Council For Human Rights,0 5 an independent prosecutor
should have the ability to prosecute cases on his or her own accord.1"6
Furthermore, nations like the United States, who are concerned about biased
prosecutions should be comforted by proposed checks and balances involved
in those prosecutions.107 The proposal of a judicial pre-screening of all
investigations is an example of an effective check.10 8 This neutral panel
would provide an effective safeguard against biased prosecutions." 9 With
such a provision in place there would be no need to keep the provision
allowing involved nations to take a case."0 To allow this would only
complicate the judicial process by providing an unnecessary jurisdictional
option.
Furthermore, the provision allowing the UN Security Council to delay
investigations' must be removed. Although the complete removal of this
101. Id.
102. Cassell, supra note 4, at 5.
103. Id.
104. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17.
105. Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, International Criminal Court Call to Action,





110. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
111. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 16.
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provision may not be immediately realistic, the procedures outlined in the
Singapore Compromise 1 2 would be an acceptable alternative. Under the
Singapore Compromise, the Security Council would still be allowed to
prevent an investigation of the independent prosecutor provided all five of its
members were in agreement. 13 However, this block could only last for a
limited time period.'14 Such a time period remains undefined.'15 At least
under this proposal the delay of potential investigations and trials would be
limited. '16 Because an investigation under the Singapore Compromise could
not be put off indefinitely, this is a step in the right direction. 7 In fact, Great
Britain, a member of the Security Council, has already thrown its support
behind the idea. 18 While the Singapore Compromise is the best alternative
currently available, it is far from ideal because it still allows for a Security
Council postponement under certain conditions."'
Additionally, the "opt out" provision for signatory nations regarding war
crimes needs to be addressed. 2 ° The absurdity of this provision is
highlighted by the fact that non-signatory nations do not have this option.121
Some have viewed this provision as a "backward step," by extending
jurisdiction over countries not a party to it. 122 The Solution here may be
somewhat clear cut. Those nations that have signed the treaty presumably
have agreed to be subject to its jurisdiction and abide by its laws.
23
However, there should be no reason why a nation should not be subject
to rules they profess to hold others to. The proper solution is to do away with
the "opt-out" clause. This "opt-out" clause was originally included to allow
signatory nations time to amend their laws and policies so that they comply






118. Id. In December of 1997 Great Britain announced it would support an effort to enact
the Singapore Compromise. Id.
119. Id.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pt. 2.
121. Id.
122. Julia Gorin, The Dark Side of the U.N. War Crimes Court, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 31,
1998, at 4.
123. Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart, supra note 51.
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with the statute. 124 The declared intent behind the "opt-out" clause does not
correspond to the purposes behind the ICC, but serves to undermine them.
In the interest of justice and fairness, the opt-out provision should be
eliminated.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the glaring loopholes highlighted in this Note, 125 the ICC is not
likely to be amended in the near future. It may even take a case or two to
escape through the loopholes before action is taken. Hopefully, that situation
can be avoided and alterations made to the treaty to make it a more effective
tool for seeking justice.
Perhaps these steps will be taken. After all, significant progress has
been made since the idea of the ICC was once again brought to life at the
beginning of this decade. 126 Although great strides have been made, it is
difficult to enthusiastically support the view of those like Gustavo Gallno of
the Columbian Commission of Jurists who, while acknowledging that the
treaty has many "serious weaknesses," said that "this court is better than no
court."'127 The Secretary General of Amnesty International, Pierre San, was
correct when he stated the treaty "... needs work to make the court truly
effective." 
128
This Note offers suggestions that can play a significant role in the
crafting of a better court. First, the international community should eliminate
the provision allowing a nation involved in a case to take it instead of the
ICC.129 In place of that provision, the international community should move
towards expanding the independent prosecutor's powers to pursue a case and
124. United Nations Department of Public Information, Setting the Record Straight: The
International Criminal Court. <Gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org/OOorgs/icc/undocs/faq-dpi.txt>
(visited October 15, 1998) at 3 (This source is on file with the New YorkLaw School Journal
of International and Comparative Law).
125. See supra Part II.C.3.
126. CICC Home Page, supra note 1.
127. Richard Dicker, Human Rights Watch, Perspectives on the Rome Treaty from Around
the World, (visited ???) <perspectives.txt at gopher.igc.apc.org> (This source is on file with
the New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
128. Pierre Sane, Amnesty International Secretary General, Perspectives on the Rome Treaty
from Around the World,(visited ???) <perspectives.txt at gopher.igc.apc.org> (This source is
on file with the New YorkLaw School Journal ofInternational and Comparative Law). Sane
added that Amnesty International would " ... continue to push for a court that could have a
real impact in protecting millions of future victims."
129. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
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rely on proposed checks and balances, such as judicial pre-screening of
investigations.13
Second, the international community should remove the provision
allowing the UN Security Council to delay investigations indefinitely.'31
Instead, the international community should move in favor of a plan such as
the Singapore Compromise that would at least put more stringent conditions
on this provision, 132 if not do away with it entirely.
Finally, the "opt out" provision must be modified or eliminated. 133 It is
unnecessary and unfair. Nations that have agreed to the terms of a treaty
should be made to abide by its terms. 1
34
Hopefully these changes can be made before any criminals escape
justice. If even one person is able to avoid prosecution for crimes that offend
the human race, that is one person too many.
Brian D. Keatts
130. Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, supra note 105.
131. Rome Statute, supra note 72, art. 16.
132. War Crimes, supra note 92, at 2.
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